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THE INTENTION TO CREATE A RESTRAINT
N dealing with the subject of restraints upon alienation, the first ques-
tion to be considered in a particular case is whether, by a fair con-
struction of the language employed, the intent to create a restraint is
manifested. If this question can be answered in the negative, there is
no need to discuss the validity of such a restriction. From one point
of view, the problem of intention ought to be considered first in a dis-
cussion of restraints. It is easier, however, to study the intent problem
with the background of knowledge supplied by a familiarity with the
rules governing restraints.
It is clear that language which, reasonably interpreted, expresses
merely a desire that the grantee shall not alienate, or which advises
against alienation, does not create a restraint. If the conveyor should
say, "I desire that the grantee herein shall not alienate the land conveyed
during his lifetime, but I do not prohibit such alienation," undoubtedly
no problem in restraints would arise. Unfortunately, in some instances
conveyors probably intend precatory language to express an actual pro-
hibition. It might be a reasonable rule to hold that prima facie the
words "desire", "wish", etc., do not express a prohibition, since they are
at least ambiguous."' The problem is analogous to that found in the
law of Trusts, where the question arises whether such language should
be construed to express the intent to create a trust. The trend of mod-
ern authority answers that question in the negative. 5
Courts have sometimes characterized as "precatory", or "admoni-
tory", language which, by a reasonable interpretation, must be taken
to express a restraint upon alienation. In Wright v. Jenks, 10 a testator
devised land to H for life, and on his death to S and D "during their
natural lives and to their children of their bodies after them, they not
having the right to sell, encumber or dispose of the same." It is diffi-
cult to imagine language more clearly adapted to express a disabling
restraint. Yet the court declared that "a mere admonitory gesture"
*Continued from 44 YALE L. J. 1186.
tProfessor of Law, University of Illinois.
258. Suh language was held not to express a restraint in Blackshere v. Samuel Ready
School, 94 Md. 773, 51 Atl. 1056 (1902). See also note 208 supra: remarks in Bramley
v. White, 281 Mass. 343, 349, 183 N. E. 761, 763 (1933).
259. In re Humphrey's Estate [1916] 1 Ir. R. 21; REsTATFamT, ThusTs (Tent, Draft
No. 1, 1930) § 37.
260. 124 Kan. 604, 261 Pac. 840 (1927).
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was insufficient to create a restraint. One would likely not quarrel with
the disposition to hold invalid the restraint here attempted; but to
characterize the language used as "admonitory" is inaccurate, and leads
to confusion. That the court was moved primarily by the feeling that
such a restraint ought to be void, appears from the further statement
that a restraint is invalid unless there is a trust created, a power of
reentry, or a gift over. The decision is merely a holding phrased, in
misleading language, that a disabling restraint is void.201
Even when the language of restraint is mandatory in form, it need
not be interpreted literally. Many of the decisions dealing with this
problem have adopted a highly mechanical standard of construction,
which assumes that language in terms restraining alienation is to be in-
terpreted literally, in the sense in which it would be used by a skilled
draftsman, despite the fact that the instrument was obviously not drafted
by such a person. Since there is no rule which requires a conveyor to
express himself in particular words, the problem is to determine what
the particular conveyor meant by the language of his instrument. Doubt-
less, words must be construed in their ordinary sense, unless there is
something in the context to indicate that they have been used in a dif-
ferent sense. Two inquiries, therefore, are suggested: What is the
ordinary meaning of the language employed? And, is there anything
in the context to suggest a deviation from that common meaning?
The expert lawyer knows that a life tenant has power to alienate his
life estate, and that he does not have power to transfer any greater in-
terest. It cannot be assumed that the layman understands dearly the
scope of the life tenant's power. Many instruments of conveyance are
drafted by laymen, or by lawyers whose knowledge of real property law
is not extensive. The writer believes that the unskilled draftsman often
employs the language of restraint to express the intent to create a life
estate only. If the conveyor declares in substance that he conveys land
to A; that A is not to sell or otherwise dispose of it; and that, upon
the death of A, it shall pass to A's children, the instrument may reas-
onably be construed to create a life estate in A, with a remainder to his
children. To create a life estate, it is not necessary to use the words
"life estate", or to state that the conveyee is to have the enjoyment for
his life only. 62 The sale of a life estate is a relatively uncommon
transaction, outside of the experience of the average layman; to him, a
sale of land means a sale of the fee simple interest. When he states,
261. For further illustrations of the loose use of the words "precatory", "admonitory",
and "advisory" see note 208, supra. See also, Bourget v. BIanchard, 7 Q. L. Rep. 322, 323
(1881); cf. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 123 Pa. 329, 16 AUt. 783 (1889); Sparr v. Kidder, 265
Pa. 61, 108 AtI. 204 (1919).
262. Bramley v. White, 281 Ma.ss. 343, 183 N. E. 761 (1933) (intent to create a life
estate inferred principally from language which "requested" an equal division of what might
"remain" at the death of the first taker, among children of the conveyor).
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therefore, that he conveys to A, and that A is not to sell, he means that
A is not to sell the fee,--thereby manifesting his intent to create in A
an estate of limited size, which does not carry with it the power to
alienate in fee. It is unlikely that he intends specifically to restrain
transfer of the life interest which he has attempted to create. Since
he thinks in terms of alienation of the fee, the possibility of transfer of
the life interest only is not definitely present to his mind. This sup-
position concerning the layman's mode of expression finds its justification
in experience with that large class of persons among whom the average
conveyor is numbered; and in a study of the many reported decisions
in which the contexts of the instruments involved seem to make evident
that the language of restraint was employed with the purpose and in
the sense above suggested.e 3  We must consider, therefore, whether it
is possible to devise reasonable rules of construction which will take into
account this supposititious state of mind of the conveyor.
The intent to create a fee simple or absolute interest, and at the same
time to impose a restraint upon the alienation thereof, can be clearly
expressed. If the conveyor specifically declares that he conveys to A
in fee simple, but that A shall not have power to alienate the land, there
would seem to be but one construction admissible,-that the intent is
to impose a restraint upon a fee simple. 4 While it is possible that
the conveyor did not know the meaning of "fee simple", and did not use
it in a technical sense, yet it is a word which cannot be said to have
any popular meaning as distinguished from its technical significance;
and there is nothing in the context to suggest that it was used in any
263. Where the conveyor expressly stipulates a life estate in the first taker, and
declares that he shall not alienate such life estate, it must be assumed that an actual re-
straint upon alienation of the life estate is intended. Gray v. Shinn, 293 Il. 573, 127 N.
E. 755 (1920); cf. McCormick Harvesting-Machine Co. v. Gates, 75 Iowa 343, 39 N. W.
657 (1888). Where the conveyor expressly stipulates a life estate in the first taker, It
is not necessary to rely upon the language of restraint as indicative of the Intent to
create such an estate. For this reason, it was clear in the following cases that the
first taker had a life estate only: McCleary v. Ellis 54 Iowa 311, 6 N. W. 571 (1880);
Nebraska National Bank v. Bayer, 123 Neb. 391, 243 N. W. 115, (1932); Walker
v. Milligan, 45 Pa. 178 (1863); Ehrisman v. Sener, 162 Pa. 577, 29 Aft. 719 (1894); Gaines
v. Sullivan, 117 S. C. 475, 109 S. E. 276 (1921); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50, 53 S.
W. 339 (1899); Kerns v. Carr, 82 W. Va. 78, 95 S. E. 606 (1918). In none of these
cases did the language of the conveyance expressly state that the first taker should not
alienate his life interest; in all instances the declaration was that he should not alienate
the "land," or some equivalent expression. Taking the language of restraint in conjunction
with the gift of the remainder, with which it was closely associated in each case, It would
seem reasonable to infer that such language was inserted only for the purpose of protect-
ing the future interest against a power of alienation which the unlearned draftsman feared
the life tenant would otherwise have. A fortiori, where the precise quantum of the first
taker's estate has not been expressly stated, it is easy to infer that the language of restraint
was intended merely to delimit it.
264. Bowen v. John, 201 Ill. 292, 66 N. E. 357 (1903).
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other sense. It will be noted in the illustration above suggested, that
there is no language which could possibly be construed to create a re-
mainder after a life estate.-s To construe the language to create a life
estate, would leave the future interest undisposed of, and, if the convey-
ance be by will, might result in an intestacy as to such interest. Such
a construction would conflict with the express specification of a fee
simple, and possibly with the presumption of intent to make a complete
testamentary disposition.06
By a similar process of reasoning, a gift to A "'and his heirs," with no
language susceptible of interpretation as the gift of a remainder, should
be construed to create a fee simple with an intended restraint where the
language of restraint is employed. -07  Since it is now generally pre-
sumed that a conveyor, whether the conveyance be by deed or by will,
intends to transfer his whole interest in the property, it may be reason-
able to adopt the same construction, even in the absence of words of




Where there is language which can reasonably be construed to ex-
press the gift of a remainder, the words of restraint can be viewed as
expressive of the intent to limit the first conveyee to a life estate. Even
where the intention so to limit the conveyee's estate can be inferred from
language other than that restraining alienation, the same conclusion can
be reached, for the latter language may be regarded as merely an em-
265. If there be a limitation of a future interest upon a particular contingency, which
can be construed as an executory limitation capable of divesting a fee, the inference of an
intention to create a fee is corroborated. The limitation of the future interest upon a
specified contingency suggests that under all other circumstances the land is to continue in
the ownership of the first taker. Gischell v. Ballman, 131 Md. 260, 101 AtI. 693 (1917);
Munroe v. Hall, 97 N. C. 206, 1 S. E. 651 (1887); Re Winstanley, 6 Ont. Rep. 315 (Ch.
1834).
266. Burr v. Tierney, 99 Conn. 647, 122 Ati. 454 (1923); M'Cullough's Heir. v. Gil-
more, 11 Pa. 370 (1849); McIntyre v. AfcIntyre, 123 Pa. 329, 16 At. 783 (18S9); di.
Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N. W. 707 (1909).
267. Gischell v. Baliman, 131 Aid. 260, 101 At]. 698 (1917); Munroe v. Hall, 97 .. C.
206, 1 S. E. 651 (1887); Walker v. Vincent, 19 Pa. 369 (1852); Re Winstanley, 6 Ont. Rep.
315 (Ch. 18 4).
Z68. Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273, 49 So. 676 (1909); Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 10D, 71
N. E. 422 (1904); Little v. Bowman, 276 i1. 125, 114 N. E. 519 (1916); Borse v. Blood,
68 Minn. 442, 71 N. W. 682 (1897); A'Cullough's Heirs v. Gilmore, 11 Pa. 370 (1849);
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 123 Pa. 329, 16 AtI. 783 (1889). In the above cases the restraint
was for the life of the conveyee. A fortiori, the result is the same where the restraint
is for a different period: Muhlke v. Tiedeman, 177 Ill. 606, 52 N. E. 843 (1899); Watkins
v. Minor, 214 Mfich. 380, 183 N. W. 186 (1921); Empson v. Empson, 123 Misc. 1, 204
N. Y. Supp. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1924). The result is the same also where no words of inheri-
tance appear, but where there is a future interest capable of being construed as an execu-
tory limitation divesting a fee; Goldsmith v. Peterson, 159 Iowa 692, 141 N. W. 60 (1913);
Bing v. Burrus, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222 (1907). See also note 265, supra.
19351
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
phatic reiteration of intent.2 9  This type of case is well illustrated by
Grim's Appea, 270 where a will provided that, after the death of a certain
person, land should "become the property of Joshua Logan; the said
property not to be subject to sale or mortgage, but to descend to his
children free and unencumbered." The question was, what estate Joshua
Logan took by the devise. It was held that he took a life estate only.
While the decision could have been rested on the ground that, at the
date of the case, words of inheritance, or their equivalent, were neces-
sary to create a fee, the court declared that affirmative evidence of the
intent to give only a life estate was found in the language restraining
alienation, and in the gift over upon the death of Joshua Logan. This
is a sound decision; there is other authority to the same effect,"' but
also authority contrary.2
Probably no definite rule can be laid down as to what language is
sufficient to express a gift of the remainder, where the intent to create
a life estate is suggested by the language of restraint.27a It seems clear to
the writer that in the Grim case, supra, the inference of a gift of the re-
269. Note 263, supra.
270. 1 Grant 209 (Pa. 1855).
271. Hubbird v. Goin, 137 Fed. 822 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Best v. Conn, 73 Ky. 36
(1873); Robsion v. Gray, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1296, 97 S. W. 347 (1906); Pratt v. Saline Val-
ley Ry. Co., 130 Mo. App. 175, 108 S. W. 1099 (1908) ; Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218
N. W. 86 (1928); Fox's Appeal, 99 Pa. 382 (1882); lVcWhite v. Roseman, 114 S. C. 177,
103 S. E. 586 (1920). In all of the foregoing cases, aome emphasis was placed upon the
language of restraint as indicative of the intent to create only a life estate. Cf. In re
Groth's Will, 128 Misc. 905, 220 N. Y. Supp. 505 (Surr. 1927). Best v. Corn is particu-
larly significant in that the gift of the remainder seems to have been implied from a gift
over in default of issue; Pratt v. Railroad, in that the limitation to the first taker included
the words "heirs."
272. In the following cases the limitation to the conveyee included the word "heirs,"
and there was language fully adequate to express a gift in remainder. It was held, how-
ever, that a fee simple had been created with an invalid restraint upon alienation. Mc-
Dowell v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57 (1855); Foster v. Lee, 150 N. C. 688, 64 S. E. 761 (1909) ;
Sanford v. Sanford, 106 S. C. 304, 91 S. E. 294 (1916). It is hard to comprehend why
the future limitation should be ignored, notwithstanding the use of the word "heirs." The
same result was reached in Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N. W. 707 (1909), although
no words of inheritance were used in the limitation to the conveyee.
273. A remainder is often introduced by a statement that at the death of the first
taker (life tenant), the property shall "go," or "pass" to another, or "become the property"
of another. City of Little Rock v. Lenon, 186 Ark. 460, 54 S. W. (2d) 287 (1932); Bur-
nett v. Piercy, 149 Cal. 178, 86 Pac. 603 (1906); McCleary v. Ellis, 54 Iowa 311, 6 N. W.
571 (1880); Merrill v. Pardun, 125 Neb. 701, 251 N. W. 834 (1933); In re Groth's Will,
128 Misc. 905, 220 N. Y. Supp. 505 (Surr. 1927); Fox's Appeal, 99 Pa. 382 (1882); Me-
White v. Roseman, 114 S. C. 177, 103 S. E. 586 (1920); Kerns v. Carr, 82 W. Va. 78, 95
S. E. 606 (1918). A provision that at the death of the first taker, the property "shall be
divided" among other persons, is also a frequent mode of stating a gift n remainder.
Ehrisman v. Sener, 162 Pa. 577, 29 AtI. 719 (1894); Bramley v. White, 281 Mass. 343,
183 N. E. 761 (1933); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50, 53 S. W. 339 (1899).
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mainder is possible even though the testator declared that the land
should "decend" to the children of Joshua Logan. Certainly the word
"descend" was not used in a technical sense to mean that they should
take as heirs of Logan.2 74 A provision that the conveyee shall divide
the land among her heirs has been regarded as expressive of a gift in
remainder;2 7 also a declaration that the conveyee shall retain the land
for the use of herself and her children. 76
Where it is provided that the property shall descend or pass to the
"heirs" of the conveyee, it is more difficult to infer the intent to limit
a remainder than where it is stipulated that the land shall descend or
pass to named individuals, or to such a class as "children." Where the
word "heirs" is used, it is possible to contend that the intent is to create
a fee simple, which shall descend in the technical sense of the term to
the heirs of the conveyee.277 If the language be construed, however,
274. In Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N. W. 86 (1923), no words of inhertance
were used in the gift to the first taker; the limitations were construed to create a life
estate despite the word "descend" in the limitation of the future interest. In Loosing v.
Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N. W. 707 (1909), however, a provision that the property should
be "handed down" to the children of the first taker was held not to express a gift in
remainder.
Where words of inheritance are employed in the gift to the conveyee, with a provision
that the property shall "descend," there is more difficulty in inferring the intent to create
only a life estate. It was held on this state of fatts in Foster v. Lee, 150 N. C. 62, 64
S. E. 761 (1909), that a fee was created. Cf. Gischell v. Ballman, 131 Md. 260, 101 Adt.
69S (1917).
275. Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry. Co., 130 Mo. App. 175, 108 S. W. 1099 (1903).
276. Hubbird v. Goin, 137 Fed. 822 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
277. In the following cases, the limitation to the conveyee contained the word "heirs,"
or its equivalent; there was also a provision that, upon dath of the conveyee, the land
should "descend" or should "pass," to his heirs, or words of similar import. It was held
that a fee simple had been created in the conveyee, without discussion of the Rule in
Shelley's Case: Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N. C. 521, 18 S. E. 663 (1893); Reifenyder v.
Hunter, 19 Pa. 41 (1852); Brown v. Bonnell, 4 Walk 271 (Pa. 1880); Kaufman v. Bur-
gert, 195 Pa. 274, 45 At. 725 (1900); Re Thomas and Shannon, 30 Ont. Rep. 49 (1S93).
But cf. Urich v. Merkel, 81 Pa. 332 (1876). These decisions were doubtless influenced
by the presence of the word "heirs" in the initial limitation to the conveyee. The sam2
result was reached, however, in Burr v. Tierney, 99 Conn. 647, 122 AUt. 454 (1923), where
the word "heirs" did not appear in the limitation to the conveyee. See also not(s 272, 274,
supra. Cf. Stamey v. McGinnis, 145 Ga. 226 88 S. E. 935 (1916) (limitation to A, "her
own bodily heirs and assigns," the land to "remain hers and her children, hers and their
natural lives," construed to create a fee tail).
In the following cases, the word "heirs" was construed to mean children, and it was held
that a valid remainder had been limited: Robsion v. Gray, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1296, 97 S. W.
347 (1906); Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry. Co., 130 Mo. App. 175, 103 S, W. 1099 (1903);
AlcWhite v. Roseman, 114 S. C. 177, 103 S. E. 586 (1920); Simonton v. V'hite, 93 Te. .
50, 53 S. W. 339 (1899).
A provision that the conveyee shall "keep" the property for his "heirs," together vrth
language restraining alienation, has been construed to create a fee simple: White v. Dedmon,
57 S. W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 190D) ("heirs" also appeared in initial limitations); Re
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to create a life estate with remainder, the Rule in Shelley's case may
apply. If it does apply, then a fee results, however clear the intent may
be to create a life estate only.2
Mhere the restraint is limited to some period other than the life of
the conveyee, it is more difficult to infer the intent to give him a life
estate only. Especially is this true if the restraint be for a period
possibly shorter than his life. 79
It has been stated heretofore that a life tenant may be given power
to appoint the remainder in fee either by deed or by will.2s0  The fact,
therefore, that language in terms restraining alienation is qualified so as
to allow transfer in a particular manner, or under specified conditions,
does not necessarily militate against its construction as expressive of the
intent to limit the conveyee to a life estate.81 It may be conceded
that the grant to the conveyee of a power to transfer in fee is suggestive
of the intent to convey a fee rather than a life estate, if the latter has
not been definitely specified. The force of the suggestion increases in
proportion to the scope of the power of alienation conferred. In this
type of case, it becomes extremely difficult to determine whether the
intent is to create a life estate with a remainder subject to divestiture
by the exercise of a power in the life tenant, or to create a fee simple
with a gift over upon failure of the first taker to transfer in the manner
Watson and Woods, 14 Ont. Rep. 48 (Ch. 1887). A devise to A "in trust and for the
use of his heirs," he to have the same "during his natural life," was held to create a fee in
Kepple's Appeal, 53 Pa. 211 (1866); cf. Teany v. Mains, 113 Iowa 53, 84 N. W. 953 (1901).
278. Turner v. Hallowell Savings Institution, 76 Me. 527 (1884); Doebler's Appeal, 64
Pa. 9 (1869); Lawrence v. Singleton, 17 S. V. 265 (Tenn. 1875); Seay v. Cockrell, 102
Tex. 280, 115 S. W. 1160 (1909). Where land is devised to A ith a restraint upon aliena-
tion, and he takes any possible future interest as heir, a fee is created, irrespective of what
meaning the language restraining alienation may have been intended to express. Grant v.
Carpenter, 8 R. I. 36 (1864). Cf. Gleason v. Fayerweather, 70 Mass. 348 (1855).
279. The inference of an intent to create a fee which arises from the absence of a
future interest is corroborated by the fact that the restraint is not coextensive in duration
with the life of the conveyee. See note 268 supra. If there be a gift of a future interest
in unequivocal terms, a life estate may be inferred, even though the restraint is not thug
coextensive: Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N. W. 86 (1928); In re Groth's Will, 128
Misc. 905, 220 N. Y. Supp. 505 .(Surr. 1927). In Berry v. Spivey, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 18,
97 S. W. 511 (1906), a limitation to A "in fee simple," habendum to her and "the heirs of
her body" by H, "without the power" to alienate until her youngest child should have
attained the age of twenty-one, was seemingly held to create a life estate in A with re-
mainder to her children, despite the absence of language which could reasonably be re-
garded as expressly limiting a remainder.
280. See text, supra, at note 228.
281. If it is stipulated that the conveyee shall not alienate without the consent of
another, it is implied that he may transfer with such consent. Burnet v. Piercy, 149 Cal,
178, 86 Pac. 603 (1906). Conversely, the declaration that he shall have power to alienate
under particular circumstances, or in a certain manner, impliedly denies the power to




permitted. The validity of such a gift over has been discussed pre-
viously. 2 But for the rules which have been developed in respect
to gifts over on failure to alienate, it would rarely be important to
differentiate between the two constructions mentioned. In the case of an
inexpertly drafted instrument, it is hopeless to base a construction upon
supposed intent. Since the draftsman probably never heard of the
sophistical distinction, he naturally had no intent on the point. "
So long as the rule which invalidates a gift over upon failure to alien-
ate persists, every limitation containing language which can be inter-
preted to express a remainder ought to be construed to create only a
life estate in the first conveyee, with such power to transfer as the lan-
guage may require. Especially would this be true where the limita-
tion to the first conveyee does not include words of inheritance or their
equivalent.
While the language of restraint, where not employed actually to ex-
press an intended restraint, is typically meant to declare or emphasize
the creation of a life estate, it may be used for other purposes. Thus,
it may express the intent to create a fee tail; 2 4 a condition, precedent
or subsequent;2" 6 or some other qualification of the estate conveyed to
the first taker. -8 7
282. Supra, subtitle II, D.
283. See note 230, supra, on the situation in which there is language adequate to create
a remainder, and in which words of inheritance are not used in the gift to the firt taker.
Cf. Fox's Appeal, 99 Pa. 382 (1882). See note 231, supra, on the situation in which words
of inheritance appear in the limitation to the first taker. Cf. Urich v. Merkel, 81 Pa. 332
(1876). Where there is no language capable of construction as the gift of a remainder,
the inference of a fee (see text supra at notes 264-268) is corroborated by the grant to
the conveyee of a power to alienate: Goldsmith v. Petersen, 159 Iowa 692, 141 N. W. 60
(1913); Muhlke v. Tiedemann, 177 Ill. 606, 52 N. E. 843 (1899); Bowen v. John, 201
IlL. 292, 66 N. E. 357 (1903) ; M cIntyre v. McIntyre, 123 Pa. 329, 16 At. 783 (18S9) ; Bing
v. Burrus, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222 (1907); cf. Kaufman v. Burgert, 195 Pa. 274, 45 At].
725 (1900).
A fee has often been inferred from the grant of a power of disposal where such infer-
ence could more reasonably have been based upon other language in the conveyance: Cars
v. Dwire, 60 Iowa 442, 15 N. W. 265 (1883); Meyer v. Weiler, 121 Iowa 51, 95 N-. W.
254 (1903); Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466 (1865); Skinner v. Skinner's Adm'r, 153
Va. 326, 163 S. E. 90 (1932).
284. Gamble v. Gamble, 200 Ala. 176, 75 So. 924 (1917); cf. Sparr v. Kidder, 265 Pa.
61, 108 At. 204 (1919). But cf. also Stamey v. McGinnis, 145 Ga. 226, 88 S. E. 935 (1916).
285. Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 984 (1889) (language restraining
alienation indicated intent to make conveyee's survival of the conveyor a condition
precedent to the vesting of ownership in the former); cf. Wathins v. Minor, 214 Mich.
380, 183 N. W. 186 (1921); Durand v. Higgins, 67 Kan. 110, 72 Pac. 567 (1903) (language
in terms restraining alienation for the life of the conveyor seemed actually intended
to emphasize the reservation of a power of revocation).
286. Hayes v. Martz, 173 Ind. 279, 89 N. E. 303 (1909) (language of restraint empha-
sized the creation of an executory limitation after a fee).
287. In Deepwater Railway Co. v. Honaker, 66 W. Va. 136, 66 S. E. 104 (1909), the
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If language in terms restraining alienation has been employed for
the purpose of expressing the intent to create a life estate with remainder,
and for that purpose alone, then clearly no problem in restraints upon
alienation is raised. If the language of restraint has been used merely
to manifest the intent to create a life estate, it ought not to be construed
to impose at the same time a restraint upon the alienation of such estate.
It may be contended, however, that the language of restraint serves a
dual purpose; that the conveyor, not understanding the precise scope
of the power of alienation possessed by a life tenant, prohibits aliena-
tion without distinction between transfer of the life estate and transfer
of the' fee; and that the language must, therefore, be construed, not
merely to indicate the intent to convey a life estate, but also the intent
to restrain its alienation. The few decisions which are pertinent do not
establish any clear rule of law upon this point.288
VI
RESTRAINTS IN SUBSTANCE BUT NOT IN FORM
Any provision the legal effect of which is to restrict the enjoyment
of property by depriving the owner of a right, power, privilege or im-
munity which he would normally have, operates to make that property
less marketable. Any such provision has the practical effect in some
degree of an impediment to alienation. The degree to which alienation
is actually affected, depends upon the extent to which the particular
provision restricts enjoyment. It has been remarked that the existence
provision in a conveyance to trustees of a church, that the land should not be alienated
to a private individual, could well have been construed to express the intention to create
a determinable charitable trust.
288. In most of the cases in which language of restraint has been thought to indicate
an intent to limit the conveyee to a life estate, it has not been necessary to decide whether
it -was intended also to create a restraint upon alienation of such life estate. In the
following cases, the courts apparently were inclined to think a restraint on alienation of the
life estate was contemplated: Robsion v. Gray, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1296, 97 S. W. 347 (1906);
Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry. Co., 130 Mo. App. 175, 10 S. W. 1099 (1908); In re Groth's
Will, 128 Misc. 905, 220 N. Y. Supp. 505 (Surr. 1927). But see Hubbird v. Goin, 137 Fed,
822, 825 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905). In Turner v. Hallowell Savings Institution, 76 Me. 527
(1884), in holding that a fee had been created, the court remarked that to construe the
limitation as creating a life estate would not carry out the intent expressed in the prohibi-
tion upon alienation, as such life estate would be alienable. The obvious answer to thig
objection is, that if the creation of a life estate was all that the language restraining aliena-
tion meant, then it would be given full force if a life estate should be inferred, even though
such estate would be transferable.
Where the life estate is expressed specifically in other language than that restraining
alienation, the latter language can be deemed an emphatic reiteration of the same intent,
It is easier, however, in this type of case to construe the language of restraint to effect an
actual restraint upon alienation of the life interest. The courts have generally taken this
view. See cases cited supra, note 263.
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of any future interest makes transfer of the property more difficult,
because it necessitates the joinder of at least two persons to effect a con-
veyance of all interests in the subject matter. Any condition, with a
power of reentry reserved, or a gift over upon breach thereof, and any
covenant which imposes either an affirmative or negative duty on the
owner of the land, may make that land less attractive to potential
buyers. The balance of convenience, nevertheless, has been found to
favor the allowance of many types of conditions and covenants.
Conditions and covenants restricting the particular use to which land
may be put, are common. Building restrictions prescribing lines in
advance of which a structure may not be erected, or prohibiting abso-
lutely certain types of structures, or fixing minimum cost prices, are
familiar illustrations. -5 9  Almost equally common are those provisions
which forbid the operation of a particular trade or business, or the sale
of some particular commodity, on the land.200 These restrictions are
generally made for the benefit of other land in the locality. Where a
considerable area is thus affected, the restrictions at the outset actually
increase marketability, though in the course of time they may come
to have exactly the opposite effect. Restrictions of this type are upheld
with practical unanimity of judicial opinion, although their possible
results as impediments to alienation have been commented upon,5 '0 and
there appears to be a tendency toward strict construction.o -
Quite often the restriction upon use takes a broader sweep, limiting
enjoyment of the land to one particular use. 3 A provision of this class
commonly takes the form of a condition, with a gift over upon breach, or
289. Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 116 Pac. 729 (1911); Highland Realty Co. v.
Grove, 130 Ky. 374, 113 S. W. 420 (1o9S); Jones v. Northwest Realty Co., 149 Md.
271, 131 Ad. 446 (1925), The case last cited illustrates well the dratic power of con-
trol which a conveyor may retain by means of restrictions of this kind.
Restrictions upon the erection or alteration of structures are valid even when not
"building restrictions" in the usual sense of that term, which ordinarily signifies r--trictions
placed upon several parcels of land in pursuance of a definite scheme. Gray v. Blanchard,
25 Mass. 283 (1829).
See 2 T Ax'y, RFAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) c. 15.
290. Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55 (1879).
291. In Highland Realty Co. v. Grove, 130 Ky. 374, 377, 113 S. W. 420, 421 (1903),
the court declared that such restrictions are looked upon with disfavor, "inasmuch as
they detract from the freest use of the fee simple, and are annoying to owners and intend-
.ing purchasers, being somewhat at variance, too, with the system in vogue in thiU country,
which regards real estate as an article of commerce." See also Cowell v. Springs Co., ico
U. S. 55, 57 (1879).
292. Firth v. Mfarovitch, 160 Cal. 257, 116 Pac. 729 (1911); Highland Realty Co. v.
Grove, 130 Ky. 374, 113 S. W. 420 (1908).
293. Papst v. Hamilton, 133 Cal. 631, 66 Pac. 10 (1901) (for a school); McElvain v.
Dorris, 298 Ill. 377, 131 N. E. 608 (1921) (for mill purposes); Cornelius v. Ivens, 26
N. J. L. 376 (1857) (for railroad purposes); Danforth v. Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W.
258 (1903) (for a library).
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with a power of reentry or a possibility of reverter in the conveyor."0 '
Such provisions are usually found in conveyances for which the conveyor
has received no substantial consideration, or in situations where he has
a personal interest in the continuance of the particular use specified.
These provisions are likewise enforced, 9 5 although they constitute seri-
"ous impediments to alienation. Quite likely the decisions have been
influenced by the fact that the bulk of such provisions are found in
conveyances for a public, or semi-public purpose, and often make pos-
sible the accomplishment of a public benefit which could not otherwise
be secured.
Certain types of restrictions upon enjoyment, which impede alienation
in a marked degree, and appear to have small social value, call for par-
ticular comment. Such restrictions are: preemptive provisions, which
require that before the land may be sold, it must be offered to some
particular person; provisions requiring that upon alienation of the land,
a specified portion of the purchase price must be paid to a designated
individual; provisions which limit the right of occupancy to particular
individuals or members of a particular social group; provisions forfeit-
ing one tract of land for alienation of another tract; and provisions
which prohibit partition of land among cotenants. These various classes
of restrictions will be discussed in the order indicated.
A preemptive provision is usually found in an instrument conveying
land, and requires that, before the land conveyed may be sold, it must
first be offered to the conveyor or his heirs,00 or some other designated
person. 7 The method of enforcement for such a provision depends
upon its terms. There may be a condition of forfeiture for breach,
creating ordinarily a power of termination in the conveyor.298  Or, the
294. In the cases cited up-a note 293, the decisions were based on the assumption
that a power of termination had been created in the conveyor or his heirs, although It
would seem equally plausible in most of these cases to construe the limitations as creating
determinable fees with possibilities of reverter. See supra, notes 27, 95, 96.
295. Cases supra note 293.
296. As in Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631 (1922); Maynard v. Polhemus,
74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac, 451 (1887); Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 At. 138
(1919); Coley v. Hord, 250 Ky. 250, 62 S. W. (2d) 792 (1933); Cornelius v. Ivens, 26 N.
J. L. 376 (1857); Jackson v. Schutz, 18 Johns Ch. 174 (N. Y. 1820); DePeyster v.
Michael, 6 N. Y. 467 (1852); Overbagh v. Patrie, 8 Barb. Ch. 28 (N'. Y. 1850) aff'd. 6
N. Y. 510 (1852); Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 15 S. E. 890 (1892). Occasionally a
deed conveying land gives the conveyee a preemption as to other land retained by the con-
veyor. Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918); Skeen v. Clinchfleld Coal
Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S. E. 89 (1923).
297. As in Re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884); Bing v. Burrus, 106 Va. 478, 56 S, E. 222
(1907); cf. Rice v. Hall, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 814, 42 S. IV. 99 (1897).
298. Libby v. Wimston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631 (1922); Jackson v. Schutz, 18 Johns,,
Ch. 174 (N. Y. 1820); Jackson v. Groat, 7 Cow. 285 (N. Y. 1827). The provisions in
DePeyster v. Michael; Overbagh v. Patrie; and Hardy v. Galloway; all supra note 296,
were intended to be enforced in this manner.
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provision may be intended to operate as a covenant specifically en-
forceable in equity. 9  Where no forfeiture has been expressly stipu-
lated, it would seem reasonable to construe the provision as creating a
covenant, even though its phraseology be not that customarily employed
in covenants.300
The preemptive provision may require offer of the land to the person
entitled at a stipulated price. 01 If no price is specified in the provi-
sion, the natural interpretation is that the offeror's price must be paid
upon exercise of preemption. 2 The offeror cannot, however, demand a
price larger than that which he would ask of another purchaser. The
effect of a preemption as a practical impediment to alienation hinges
upon this matter of price. If the preemptive right requires that the land
be offered at much less than its value at the time of proposed sale,
there is an obvious check upon alienation, since the land owner will
retain the land rather than sell it at a great sacrifice. Any preemption
exercisable at a fixed price is likely to involve sacrifice to the person
bound to offer, since a fixed price is usually based upon the value of the
land when the preemptive provision is executed. °a It might be held,
therefore, that any preemptive provision fixing a price without reference
to future increase in value is void as a restraint upon alienation in sub-
stance. If the preemptioner must pay the offeror's price, however, there
is no material impediment to alienation. A preemptive provision of this
type might be enforced in so far as the rule against restraints upon
alienation is concerned.
That rule, however, is not the only one which has been thought to be
299. See Maynard v. Polhemus 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887).
300. This construction should be applied to such provisions as are found in LeVAs
Oyster Co. v. West; Henderson v. Bell; Coley v. Hord; and Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp., all supra note 296; Bing v. Burrus, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222 (1907); In re Rosher,
26 Ch. D. 801 (1884).
301. As in Libby v. Winston; Maynard v. Polhemus; Lewis Oyster Co. v. Vest;
Coley v. Hord; Henderson v. Bell, and Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., all supra note
296; Cornelius v. Ivens, 26 N. J. L. 376 (1857); In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1S874);
Rice v. Hall, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 814, 42 S. W. 99 (1897).
302. No price was fixed by the preemptive provisions in Jackson v. Schutz; Overbagh
v. Patrie, both supra note 296; DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467 (1852). In Bing v.
Burrus, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222 (1907), the price was expresly stipulated to be as much
as a stranger would pay. In Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 15 S. E. 890 (1892),
the court declared that the preemptive provision could not constitute a contract to convcy
because no price had been stipulated. Considering the nature and purpose of such a pro-
vision, this decision seems unreasonable.
303. In the case, In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884), the land was worth five times
the stipulated preemptive price. In holding the preemptive provision void, the court
stressed this fact. The great disparity between the preemptive price and the value of the
land doubtless influenced the decisions holding preemptions void in Maynard v. Polhemus,




applicable. There are two angles of approach to the problem of the
validity of a preemptive provision. The common law rule against re-
straints upon alienation holds invalid any provision which, if enforced
in the contemplated manner, would constitute a serious impediment to
alienation of a vested interest, present or future. It has been pointed
out that, by the weight of authority, the duration of the restraint is
immaterial when it is imposed upon a fee or other absolute interest.
The rule against perpetuities, in recognition of the fact that any future
interest constitutes an impediment to alienation, declares invalid any
such interest which will not necessarily vest within the prescribed period.
If a preemptive provision be considered solely from the point of view
of the rule against restraints upon alienation, its validity might be
determined according to the test above suggested. The duration of the
preemption would not be a factor. for consideration. If, however, the
solution of the problem be sought in the rule against perpetuities, the
duration of the preemption, and not its actual effect as an impediment
to alienation, becomes the controlling factor.
The analogy of the option cases is at once suggested. An option to
purchase the fee is valid if in duration it does not exceed the period of
the rule against perpetuities; it is void if it may be exercised beyond that
period, 04 except in the case of options in leases.80 5 As a practical
impediment to alienation, the ordinary option is far more objectionable
than a preemption. An option usually creates in the optionee a power
to compel conveyance of the land at a fixed price; this power the op-
tionee may exercise or not, as he may elect. For the duration of the
option, the land cannot be sold to any other person at any price, without
a liability on the part of the transferee to divestiture upon subsequent
exercise of the option. For its whole duration, therefore, the option
continues as a clog upon alienation, unless the optionee can be induced
to release it. A preemption differs from the ordinary option in two
respects. The preemptioner does not have the power to compel a con-
veyance unless the other party chooses to convey. When his willingness
to convey has been manifested, the preemptioner must then determine
whether or not he will buy; if he elects not to buy, his right is extin-
guished. If a preemption is to be characterized as an option, it must
be noted that it is an option subject to the conditions above set forth.
So far as the rule against perpetuities is concerned, therefore, a preemp-
304. Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E. 177
(1920); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914). See also: GPAY, Tim Rus/s
AGA sT PEuzW-TrUan (3d ed., 1915) § 330 et seq.; KALEs, ESTATES, Furuan INTE=EsT,
etc. IN IiOxois (2d ed., 1920) § 665; Langeluttig, Options to Purchase and Ihe Rue
against Perpetuities (1931) 17 VA. L. REV. 461. Stroman v. S. C. Power Co,, 168 S.
C. 538, 167 S. E. 844 (1933), is seemingly contra.
305. Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266 (1925); Hollander v. Central Metal
& Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442 (1908).
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tive provision should be as valid as an ordinary option under like cir-
cumstances.
The writer does not believe that the rule against perpetuities affords
a satisfactory solution of the problems involved, either in options or in
preemptions. The rule permits rights of either sort which may last for
a long period of time, and which during such period may constitute in-
surmountable barriers to alienation. The application of the rule to
option cases has probably been the result of two different processes of
reasoning. On the one hand, it has been recognized that the option in
effect creates a future interest contingent in character; where the option
is unlimited in time, this future interest seems to fall literally within
the rule. On the other hand, it has been felt that an option is a useful
and necessary device which becomes obnoxious to public policy only
when unlimited in time. Application of the rule against perpetuities has
appeared to be a reasonable method of balancing the conflicting social
interests. It would have been better, however, if the rule against
restraints upon alienation had been applied, with suitable adaptations.
Everything of value in the option device could have been preserved,
and its evils combated more effectively than can be done through the
rule against perpetuities. In regard to preemptions, it is even dearer
that the solution must lie in the rule against restraints. A preemption
at the offeror's price is unobjectionable, though perpetual, since it pre-
sents no impediment to alienation. Yet under the rule against per-
petuities it would be void.1°  A study of the preemption cases suggests
a particular difficulty in the application of the rule against perpetuities.
If the preemptive provision is in the contract form only, the equitable
future interest created can be held within the rule on the authority of
306. The decisions applying the rule against perpetuities to preemptive provizions
have generally overlooked the distinctions between options and preemptions which are sug-
gested in the text above. Attention has been concentrated on the fact that a preemption
creates a contingent future interest resembling that in an option. In Skeen v. Clinchfield
Coal Corporation, 137 Va. 397, 119 S. E. 89 (1923), A had conveyed land by deed to B,
with a provision that B should have the "exclusive right to purchase" for $300 another
tract, retained by A; and that, if A should desire to sell the same, and should so notify B,
the latter should be under a duty to purchase it for $300D. It would seem that this
provision gave to A a power to compel B to buy at any time; it also created a duty on
the part of A not to convey to anyone else without having first offered the land to B. It
did not create a power in B to compel A to sell if he should be unwilling. Apparently
the court construed the provision in the manner suggested. It declared that the cas2 inuit
be dealt with as if it involved an ordinary option to purchase; since such an option would
be void under the rule against perpetuities, this provision .as void. This tendency to
assimilate the rules governing options and preemptive provisions is unfortunate. The
objectionable character of the provision in this case was due solely to the fact that a fied
price had been stipulated; but for that fact the situation would have differed materially
from that in an ordinary option. On the distinction between options and preemptions,
see further discussion in Comments (1918) 2S Y.uE L. J. 65, (1919) 29 Y,%T L. J. 87.
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the option cases. If, however, a forfeiture has been stipulated for
failure to offer to the preemptioner before sale to another, a condition
is created; such a condition is not within the rule against perpetuities
according to the American authority °7 It is not reasonable that a pre-
emption should be enforceable merely because it is phrased in the form
of a condition subsequent with a power of reentry in the grantor, rather
than in the form of a contract right.
Since the courts have not followed consistently either the rule against
perpetuities or the rule against restraints in dealing with preemptive
provisions, it is not possible to determine definitely from the cases what
kinds of preemptive provisions are valid. In the majority of cases, pre-
emptions unlimited in time and exercisable at a fixed price have been
declared void. 08 Some of the decisions so holding are based upon the
rule against restraints upon alienation. 09 In others, however, the rule
against perpetuities has been relied upon chiefly. 10 A perpetual pre-
emption exercisable at the offeror's price would seem valid, though the
authority is scanty.311 It would be void if the rule against perpetuities
were taken to be the sole criterion of validity.
307. Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631 (1922) ; GRAY, op. Cit. supra note 304, 9
299 et seq. In Libby v. Winston, the conveyance was construed to provide a forfeiture
in event of breach of the preemptive provision; the power of reentry created in the con-
veyor was held valid.
308. In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884); Hutt v. Hutt, 24 Ont. L. R. 574 (1911);
Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887); Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn.
518, 107 At]. 138 (1919); Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918);
Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corporation, 137 Va. 397, 119 S. E. 89 (1923); see comment on
Overbagh v. Patrie (N. Y.) infra note 311. Contra: Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93
So. 631 (1922); Coley v. Hord, 250 Ky. 250, 62 S. W. (2d) 792 (1933); cf. Rice v. Hall,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 814, 42 S. W. 99 (1897); French v. Old South Society, 106 Mass, 479
(1871) (pew in a church forfeited for breach of a condition requiring offer to the society
at the original purchase price before sale to a stranger); cf. Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 523
(1876) (restriction on transfer of seat upon an exchange).
309. In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884); Hutt v. Hutt, 24 Ont. L. R. 574 (1911);
Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887).
310. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919); Henderson v. Bell,
103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918); Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119
S. E. 89 (1923).
311. Such a provision, together with other provisions of a different kind, was held valid
in Jackson v. Schutz, 18 Johns. Ch. 174 (N. Y. 1820), Spencer, C. J., concurring specially
upon the ground that the preemptive provision was valid and had been breached. In
Overbagh v. Patrie, 8 Barb. Ch. 28 (N. Y. 1850), aff'd 6 N. Y. 510 (1852), the validity
of a preemption exercisable at the offeror's price was recognized, and Jackson v. Schutz
was declared to have adjudged only the validity of that kind of a provision, In Overbagh
v. Patrie, the provision required offer to the preemptioner at the proposed sale price leIs
one-sixth thereof. This provision was held void as a restraint upon alienation. In Bing
v. Burrus, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222 (1907), the court seemingly regarded as valid a pre-
emption at the offeror's price. Unless the preemption was here regarded as limited to a
period within the rule against perpetuities, this decision is difficult to reconcile with
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A preemptive provision, by a proper construction, may be applicable
only to the first alienation of the land; 12 it may be intended to bind
only the original conveyee and not his heirs or assigns.P" These prob-
lems of construction, as well as the allied problem, under what circum-
stances such a provision may create a covenant running with the land,
are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
Closely allied historically to preemptions are "quarter-sales," "tenth-
sales," etc. These are provisions requiring the conveyee of land to pay
to the conveyor, or to some other person, a portion of the sale price upon
a transfer of the land. Such a provision is a serious deterrent to aliena-
tion, especially if payment be required upon each and every alienation.
Every transferee of the land must anticipate a certain loss if he should
subsequently desire to sell; a considerable portion of the total loss
sustainable over a period of time will in fact be cast upon the original
conveyee, at the time of his transfer to a purchaser. Any such provision
is invalid, whether applicable to every transfer,314 or only to the first? 1P
Usually these provisions require payment to the conveyor or his heirs,
and are intended to be enforced by forfeiture for breach of the condition
to pay51 Occasionally, however, they require payment to a third
person, and do not contain an express clause of forfeiture.317  In this
type of case, they should be construed to create, either covenants to
pay, or conditional equitable charges upon the land. 1 Considering such
a provision as creating an equitable charge, conditioned upon alienation
of the land, the actual nature and effect thereof becomes more apparent.
Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S. E. 89 (1923). There is s-.eminly
an intimation in Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 15 S. E. 890 (1S92), that any pre-
emptive provision is void.
A preemptive provision is valid in respect to a life estate. Since a forfeiture restraint
upon alienation of a life estate is usually valid, the effect of the preemption as a restraint
upon alienation is immaterial. Jackson v. Groat, 7 Cow. 285 (N. Y. 1827); See DePeyster
v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467, 490 (1852); Overbagh v. Patrie, 8 Barb. Ch. 28, 36, aff'd, 6 N. Y.
510 (1852).
312. This would appear a reasonable construction in many of the cases. In some
instances, however, it is clear that the preemption is intended to be exercisable upon tha
occasion of each and every alienation: Overbagh v. Patrie, DePeyster v. Michael, both supa
note 311.
313. Maynard v. Polhemus,. 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887).
314. An early decision in New York held such a provision valid. Jackson v. Schutz, 13
Johns. Ch. 174 (N. Y. 1820). The rule is now conzra: DePeyster v. Michael; Overbagh v.
Patrie, both supra note 311. Such a provision is valid in respect to a life estate. J't.?con
v. Groat, 7 Cow. 285 (N. Y. 1827).
315. In re Elliott [18961 2 Ch. 353; Weiting v. Billinger, 50 Hun. 324, 3 N. Y. Supp.
361 (1888) ; Dunlop v. Dunlop's E.rs, 144 Va. 297, 132 S. E. 351 (1926).
316. As in cases, supra note 314.
317. As in cases, supra note 315.
318. See opinion In re Elliott (1896) 2 Ch. 353; also, Dunlop v. Dunlop's E'a, 144 Va.
.297, 132 S. E. 351 (1926).
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It amounts virtually to a gift over of a partial interest in the land upon
alienation; it differs only in degree from a complete gift over upon
alienation, and should, therefore, be void.3 10 If land has been conveyed
with reservation of a rent charge, any provision increasing the rent upon
alienation of the land is void, 20 since it has the same effect as a provision
requiring payment of a portion of the sale price upon transfer.
Conditions that stipulate a forfeiture for failure of the conveyee of
land to occupy it himself are found occasionally. They constitute a
great obstacle to alienation, if valid. They make the land practically
unmarketable for the life of the conveyee at least, since he is not likely
to attempt a transfer which will normally necessitate his removal from
the land, and thus cause forfeiture of his estate; and certainly no pur-
chaser will knowingly risk the loss of that for which he has paid. Since
a life estate may usually be subjected to a forfeiture restraint, a provi-
sion of this kind is valid in respect to such an estate.321 Where the
condition of occupancy is imposed upon a fee, it should be void, and
this view apparently has been approved in the few cases in which the
problem has arisen."'
Restrictions upon occupancy of land by members of a particular
social group are pertinent at this point. For convenience, however,
319. In Weiting v. Billinger, 50 Hun. 324, 3 N. Y. Supp. 361 (1888), the provision re-
quired payment of $1500 to third parties if the land should be sold at sheriff's sale for a debt
of the conveyee. The obnoxious effect of such provisions becomes strikingly clear in this
situation; if valid, they operate to deprive a creditor in substantial degree of resort to the
property of his debtor, even though he may actually have taken a mortgage upon the same.
320. Billing v. Welch, 6 Ir. R. C. L. 88 (1871); cf. Mahony v. Tynte, 1 Ir. Ch. R.
577 (1851).
321. Taylor v. McCowen, 154 Cal. 798, 99 Pac. 351 (1908); Lewis v. Lewis, 74 Conn.
630, 51 AtI. 854 (1902), considered on the merits in 76 Conn. 586, 57 Atl. 735 (1904);
Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889 (1890); Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276,
70 N. W. 583 (1897). See comment on Scruggs v. Murray, 70 Tenn. 44 (1878) note 238
supra; cf. Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 119 N. IV. 797 (1909); Gilmore v. Hamil-
ton, 83 Ind. 196 (1882). It would seem that in an assignment of a term of years, a gift
over upon cessation of occupancy by the assignee is valid. Doe d, Norfolk v. Hawke, 2
East 481 (K. B. 1802).
322. Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Caines 346 (N. Y. 1805) (devise to children conditioned
upon their continuing to inhabit a certain town); Pardue v. Givens, 54 N. C. 306 (1854)
(devise to children containing a provision that was probably intended to restrain parti-
tion, and that limited the land over on cessation of occupancy).
In Stansbury v. Hubner, 73 Md. 228, 20 AtI. 904 (1890), land was devised to a grand-
son, X, "and the heirs of his body, so long as they hold and till the same; should ho die
without heirs of his body, my will and desire is that my grandson .. . (Y) . . . should
have it, him, his heirs, forever." The court declared that there was no devise over to
take effect upon a failure to hold and till the land; that there was a condition subsequent,
which was void as a restraint upon alienation, since it forbade transfer of the land, the
word "hold" requiring retention of title. Since the decision seems to turn in large measure
upon the construction of the word "hold" to require retention of title, the case i not
a clear precedent upon the point of forfeiture for failure to occupy.
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the problem here involved has been discussed previously in connection
with restraints upon alienation to members of such a group.
Somewhat similar in effect to a requirement of personal occupancy,
is a provision prohibiting the alienation of one tract separately from
another. In Camp v. Cleary,2 4 two lots, A and B, were conveyed with
a gift over of both if the conveyee should ever alienate lot A. In this
situation, there is no restraint in form upon the alienation of lot B, which
the conveyee may transfer at any time. Any purchaser of lot B, how-
ever, must take it subject to the risk of divestiture if his grantor should
subsequently alienate lot A. In fact, such a provision constitutes a
serious impediment to alienation of lot B, and should be void. Other-
wise, a practically effective restraint may be accomplished by conveying
a tract in parcels, with a provision that alienation of one particular
parcel shall cause forfeiture of all parcels. While the problem has sel-
dom arisen, the trend of judicial opinion seems to regard as void all
restraints prohibiting the alienation of one tract separately from
another.3
A restraint upon partition is not technically a restraint upon aliena-
tion, since it does not forbid transfer of a cotenant's undivided share 2
If, however, the assignee of the undivided share does not have the power
to compel partition, the restraint is a marked obstacle to alienation, since
the great majority of prospective buyers desire to own in severalty, and
not as cotenants. The absence of such a power in the assignee, more-
over, makes it more difficult for creditors of a cotenant to satisfy their
claims by execution upon his undivided interest. If the assignee does
have a power to compel partition, evasion of the restriction against it is
simple, since a cotenant could assign his undivided share to a nominal
assignee and obtain partition in his name. In view of the favorable
attitude of the courts toward these restrictions, it may safely be assumed
that the assignee does not have this power, although there is little direct
authority2 27 Since a restraint upon partition permits transfer of the
323. See supra, subtitle II, C; notes 182-184.
324. 76 Va. 140 (1882).
325. Smith v. Clark, 10 Md. 186 (1856); Estate of Robert Lunham, S Ir. R. Eq. 170
(1871). See also the discussion of restraints qualified to permit alienation to all but a
few designated persons, in text, supra note 163 et seq.; GRAY, RLsTaR=m urz: T=
ALEATION OF PROPERT" (2d ed. 1895) § 29b.
The decision in Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140 (1882), held the restraint valid upon other
grounds, and did not discuss the problem here considered. See text supra, at notes 93
and 236.
326. This point is doubtless assumed in all the decisions upholding restrictions upon
partition. It was emphasized in Porter v, Tracy, 179 Iowa 1295, 162 N. W. EDD (1917);
Doubleday v. Newton, 27 Barb. Ch, 431 (N. Y. 1855); Hunt v. Wright, 47 N. H. 395
(1867); d. Kepley v. Overton, 74 Ind. 448 (1881). The undivided interest of a cotenant
is subject to levy of execution: Sewell v. Taylor, 224 S. W. 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
327. Partition was denied an assignee in Stewart v. Jones, 219 Mlo. 614, 118 S. W. 1
(1909). The problem was stated, but not decided, in Sewell v. Taylor, supra note 326.
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undivided shares, it does not prevent a voluntary partition by execution
of deeds conveying the undivided interests of the cotenants in particular
portions of the land. The restraint is extinguished by a conveyance of
all the undivided shares to a single person, whether he be a cotenant or
a stranger.
A restraint upon partition may originate in either of two ways. It
may be imposed by the creator of the cotenancy at the time of its
creation, 2 or it may arise out of an agreement among cotenants.2
There are various methods for enforcement of such a restriction. Where
it has been imposed by the creator of the cotenancy, a forfeiture may
have been stipulated for an attempt to procure partition in breach of the
restriction. Such a provision, however, is unusual. 30  In its absence,
the restriction is construed as a disabling restraint which operates to bar
a suit for partition.3 ' Its effect is analogous to that of a disabling re-
straint upon alienation, which deprives the person subject thereto of the
legal power to transfer. Where the restriction against partition is the
result of an agreement among cotenants, it usually takes the form of a
covenant; if valid, it is enforced by appropriate remedies. Since parti-
tion is now usually an equitable proceeding, the covenant operates in
equity as a bar to the suit."s
Restraints upon partition have usually been held valid when limited in
duration to a period measured by lives in being and twenty-one years,83
328. Cox v. Johnson, 242 Ill. 159, 89 N. E. 697 (1909); Kepley v. Overton, 74 Ind,
448 (1881) ; Porter v. Tracy, 179 Iowa 1295, 162 N. W. 800 (1917) ; Highfill v. Xonnerman,
241 Ky. 282, 43 S. W. (2d) 657 (1931); Hill v. Hill, 261 Mo. 55, 168 S. W. 1165 (1914);
Freeland v. Anderson, 114 Neb. 822, 211 N. W. 167 (1926); Hunt v. Wright, 47 N. 11.
396 (1867) ; Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N. C. 445, 152 S. E. 398 (1930). One cotenant can-
not, upon a conveyance of his interest, create a restraint effective to bar partition at the
suit of another cotenant. Kean v. Tilford, 81 Ky. 600 (1884).
329. Arnold v. Arnold, 308 Ill. 365, 139 N. E. 592 (1923); Black v. Tyler, 18 Mass.
150 (1822); Eberts v. Fisher, 54 Mich. 294, 20 N. W. 80 (1884); Brown v. Coddington,
72 Hun 147, 25 N. Y. Supp. 649 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App.
Div. 515, 139 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st dep't, 1913).
330. There was a forfeiture stipulated in Greene v. Greene, 125 NS. Y. 506, 26 N. E.
739 (1891). It would seem, however, that in this case the restriction was directed against
both voluntary and involuntary partition; it was, therefore, a restraint upon transfer of
the undivided interests. Apparently it was so construed by the court.
331. The cases cited supra note 328 so hold. There are many other decisions to the
same effect.
332. Cases, supra note 329. In Black v. Tyler, 18 Mass. 150 (1822), it was held that
such agreement did not bar an action at law for partition, but it was intimated that equity
would give relief against its breach.
333. Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 72 N. E. 429 (1904) (for life of life tenant); Cox v.
Johnson, 242 Il. 159, 89 N. E. 697 (1909) (until youngest cotenant should have attained
sixteen); Heininger v. Meissmer, 261 Ill. 105, 103 N. E. 565 (1913) (for life of life tenant);
Arnold v. Arnold, 308 Ill. 365, 139 N. E. 592 (1923) (for unexpired portion of certain
leases); Daubman v. Daubman, 353 I1. 69, 186 N. E. 520 (1933) (for life of survivor
of 6 cotenants) ; Brown v. Brown, 43 Ind. 474 (1873) (for minorities of infant cotenants) ;
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that period having been adopted by analogy from the rule against per-
petuities. Restraints not thus limited are probably void, although there
are few decisions upon the point.4 In jurisdictions in which the com-
Kepley v. Overton, 74 Ind. 448 (1881) (ibid.); Porter v. Tracy, 179 Iowa 1295, 162 N.
W- 800 (1917) (for 5 years); Young v. Young, 49 S. W. 1074 (Ky. 1899) (for minority
of youngest cotenant); Highfill v. Konnerman, 241 Ky. 282, 43 S. W. (2d) 657 (1931)
(ibid.); Eberts v. Fisher, 54 Mich. 294, 20 N. W. 80 (1S84) (for period of a ten-year lease) ;
Stewart v. Jones, 219 Mo. 614, 11S S. W. 1 (1909) (for life of life tenant) ; Hill v. Hill, 261
Mo. 55, 168 S. W. 1165 (1914) (for lives of 2 life tenants); Shelton v. Bragg, 189 S. W. 1174
(Mo. 1916) (for life of life tenant); Peterson v. Damonde, 98 Neb. 370, 152 N. W. 786
(1915) (for 16 years); Freeland v. Anderson, 114 Neb. 822, 211 N. W. 167 (1926) (for
life of life tenant); Ex parte Watts, 130 N. C. 237, 41 S. E. 289 (1902) (for a life and
21 years); Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N. C. 445, 152 S. E. 39S (1930) (until majority of
youngest cotenant in remainder); cf. Reid v. Armistead, 151 So. S74 (Ala. 1934). Con-
cerning the effect of a mandatory or discretionary power of partition conferred upon an
executor, as a bar to a suit for partition, see Cahill v. Cahill, 62 N. J. Eq. 157, 49 At. £G9
(1901).
There is little contrary authority. In Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 At. 24 (1904), a
testator devised land to his children in equal shares, providing that it should not be sold
for purposes of division for a period of ten years, and expressing his wish that for such
period the children should live together and use the income of the property for their sup-
port. In a suit for construction of the will, it was held that this restriction was void.
The court declared that practically it restrained alienation of any cotenant's share for ten
years. Cf. Lane v. Lane, 90 Mass. 350 (1864).
In Reinders v. Koppelman, 68 Mo. 482 (1878), a partition by sale was permitted despite
a clearly expressed restraint against "sale" for 25 years. There was no dis..:ann of
the point. See note 341, infra. In Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Ao. 183, 19
S. W. 75 (1892), in holding void a perpetual restraint against partition, the court expres:ad
itself in language which argued strongly against the validity of any and all restraints upon
the right to partition. Now, however, the rule is established in Missouri that a restraint
upon partition for a limited period is valid. See Missouri cases cited supra; ee also note
336, infra.
The Kentucky doctrine which permits restraints upon alienation for a reasonable period
of time has been discussed. Text supra, at notes 102-105. According to this doctrine,
a restraint for the whole life of the conveyee is void. Note 104 supra. In dealing v.ith
the problem of restraints against partition, it would not be logically imperative to follow
this analogy. In Cammack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 263, 250 S. W. 963 (1923), it was hed
that a restraint upon "sale for division" during the life of one cotenant was void. It is
not clear whether the court viewed the restraint as against alienation, or whether it thought
that a restriction against partition should be limited in time in like manner as a restraint
upon alienation.
334. Haeusser v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188, 19 S. W. 75 (1892); cf. Lane v.
Lane, 90 Mass. 350 (1864); Smith v. Dunwoody, 19 Ga. 237 (1856). In Hunt v. Wright,
47 N. H. 396 (1867), a restriction unlimited in time was held valid. Apparently, how-
ever, a majority of the cotenants had the power to extinguish it. This factor may
reconcile the decision with the rule that a restraint upon partition must he limited in time.
Where the power to extinguish is dependent upon the unanimous consent of the cotenants,
the restraint is probably void unless limited in time. See infra, subtitle VII. Cf. Martin
v. Martin, 170 Ill 639, 48 N. E. 924 (1897) (agreement not to partition, unlimited in
time, held to bar partition during a two-year term granted in pursuance of said agree-
ment).
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mon law rule against perpetuities has been modified in respect to the
measurement of time, one might expect to find a corresponding difference
in the period over which a restraint upon partition can be made opera-
tive. If the rule in a particular state forbids the suspension of the
power of alienation for a longer period than two lives in being, it might
be thought that two lives would be the maximum period for which a
restraint upon partition could be made effective, and that no restraint
for a gross term of years would be valid. Apparently, however, the
analogy has not been followed to its logical conclusion 3 5 If it can
be said that the time limitation above mentioned has been definitely
established in respect to restraints upon partition, that fact implies a
recognition of their practical effect as impediments to alienation, and
suggests that they ought not to be accorded any especial judicial favor.
In spite of this natural inference, in at least three states there are
statutes providing that partition may not be had contrary to th; intention
of the creator of the cotenancy. 6  The attitude of the courts, too, has
been strangely favorable. Where it is reasonably possible to construe
language so as to avoid the inference of an intent to restrain partition,
one would expect to find that construction adopted. It has been pointed
1
335. While the New York decisions are not wholly clear upon the point, It would
seem that a restriction upon partition is valid though it may be operative for a period
longer than two lives. In Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App. Div. $15, 139 N. Y. Supp.
314 (1st Dep't, 1913), an agfeement among three cotenants not to partition was held a
bar to a suit for that purpose. The court emphasized the fact that the co-owners could
convey jointly at any time. This argument, however, proves entirely too much, as It
would validate any restriction upon partition, irrespective of a time limitation. See
comment on Hunt v. Wright, supra note 334. In Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1,
20 N. E. 814 (1889), it was held in a suit to construe a will that a restriction upon par-
tition for five years was valid. In this case, the executors had power to partition within
that period. In Doubleday v. Newton, 27 Barb. Ch. 431 (N. Y. 1855), there was a
provision which may have been intended to restrain partition until the youngest of
several cotenants should have attained 21. The validity of this provision as a restraint
upon partition was seemingly not argued, but it was intimated that it would be valid.
In Converse v. Kellogg, 7 Barb. Ch. 590 (N. Y. 1850), "division" of land was restrained
for 10 years. The validity of this restraint was not in issue, but it was intimated that
it was valid. Cf. also Brown v. Coddington, 72 Hun 147, 25 N. Y. Supp. 649 (Sup. Ct.
1893); Ogilby v. Hickok, 144 App. Div. 61, 128 N. Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't, 1911), nff'd.,
202 N. Y. 614, 96 N. E. 1123 (1911). In Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E, 739
(1891); Oxley v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 340 (1866); and Adams v. Berger, 18 N. Y. Supp. 33
(Sup. Ct. 1891), restrictions for gross periods were held invalid. These restrictions, being
broad in their terms, were probably viewed as restraints upon alienation as well as upon
partition.
336. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 8090; IND. STAT. ANx. (Burns,
1926) § 1265; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1557. These statutes prescribe no time limitation
for the duration of a restraint upon partition. Probably some limitation would be Im-
posed as a matter of judicial interpretation. Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo.
188, 19 S. W. 75 (1892), It may be noted also that these statutes in terms apply only
where the cotenancy has been created by a will.
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out that language in terms restraining alienation may be employed to
express a meaning quite different from its literal import. In like man-
ner, language which suggests a restraint upon partition may be in-
tended to convey a materially different idea. When a testator devises
all his property to his widow for life, and then provides that after her
death the property "shall be divided" among his children, he probably
intends by this language to limit a remainder to the children. To say
that the property shall be divided among the children, means merely that
they shall take equal undivided shares; "divided"' does not refer to
physical division of the land, but to division of the ownership into parts.
Yet in several decisions the courts have inferred a restraint upon parti-
tion during the life of the widow from language of this kind.s? It is
almost inconceivable that such language should have been so interpreted
as to raise an impediment to alienation. It certainly does not express a
restraint upon partition clearly; it is at least ambiguous, and ought
therefore, to be so construed as to facilitate alienation. It would seem
a further misfortune that the Restatement of the Law of Property, now
being formulated by the American Law Institute, should appear to ap-
prove the construction criticised above. 38 A sounder judicial attitude
is illustrated in a New Hampshire case,"'o in which a deed contained the
337. This has been held in Illinois: Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 72 N. E. 429 (1934);
Heininger v. Melismer, 261 I. 105, 103 N. E. 565 (1913); d. Daubman v. Daubman,
353 Ill. 69, 186 N. E. 520 (1933). The same result has been reached in several Miz-ouri
decisions: Stewart v. Jones, 219 Mo. 614, 118 S. W. 1 (1909); Hill v. Hill, 261 Mo. 55,
168 S. W. 1165 (1914); Shelton v. Bragg, 189 S. W. 1174 (Mo. 1916). Upon similar
reasoning, it was held in Highfill v. Konnerman, 241 Ky. 2S2 43 S. W. (2d) 657 (1931),
that partition could not be had prior to the termination of a trust which had been created
for children, with a provision that it should terminate when the youngest should have
attained 21, and that the property should then be "divided" among said children. Cf.
Brown v. Brown, 43 Ind. 474 (1873). But cf. Doubleday v. Newton, 27 Barb. Ch. 431
(N. Y. 1855).
An illustration of the extent to which this rule can be carried is found in a Nebrasia
decision, Freeland v. Anderson, 114 Neb. 822, 211 N. W. 167 (1926). There T bad devi-:d
all his property to W for life, and "at the death" of W, to his heirs. It was held that
partition during the life of W had been validly restrained. Dee v. Dee, supra, was reled
upon, although it was clearly not an authority for such a conclusion. This Nebrs
decision would seem to mean that in fact a restraint upon partition will be implied wher-
ever a life estate has been limited, since a conveyor of property will almost inevitably
use the words "at the death,' or some equivalent e-xpression, in limiting a remainder. In
three Missouri cases, language of this sort was apparently not thought to create a re-traint
upon partition: Reinders v. Koppelman, 68 Mo. 482 (1S7); Preston v. Bryant, 96 Mo.
552, 10 S. W. 78 (1888); Sikemeler v. Galvin, 124 Mo. 367, 27 S. IV. 551 (1894). But
cf. Hill v. Hill, 261 Mo. 55, 168 S. W. 1165 (1914).
On the right of owners of future interests to have a partition among themselves, subject
to the posessory estate, see Schnebly, Pouter of Life Tenant or Remainderman to ExtinguisT.
Other Interests by Judicial Process (1928) 42 HAv. L. REv. 30, 47-48.
338. (Tent. Draft No. 5) §214, comment b.
339. Spaulding v. Woodward, 53 N. H. 573 (1873).
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words, "to remain in common and undivided," immediately after the
description of the land and before the habendum. The court declared
these words were not intended to express a restraint upon partition, but
merely to describe the interests conveyed as undivided shares.
Provisions are often found which in terms restrain "sale" of the land.
Doubtless such a provision is ordinarily intended to restrain alienation,
and not merely partition. It raises the questions whether every restraint
upon alienation involves a restraint upon partition where the convey-
ance is to two or more persons, and whether such a restraint upon "sale"
should be operative to bar a partition. A restraint upon "sale" would
doubtless include a sale under order of court in a partition suit, and thus
in terms the restriction forbids partition in so far as sale may be neces-
sary. Perhaps partition in specie is not forbidden340 The Illinois court
has held in one case that a restraint upon "sale" is void, and does not
constitute a bar to partition." The writer believes that this position is
sound; since a restriction against partition ought not be favored, one
should not find it in language clearly employed to express a broader
restraint. There is, however, authority to the contrary312
Where the restraint is upon "sale or partition," there is no reason
why the restraint should not be held valid as to partition, though void
as a restraint upon transfer of the undivided interests. While it has
340. Wain v. ,Valn, 84 N. J. Eq. 293, 96 Atl. 891 (1914).
341. A stipulation that no cotenant shall "sell" his "share" manifests the intent to
impose a restraint upon alienation of the undivided interest. Askins v. Merritt, 254 11.
92, 98 N. E. 256 (1912). Where land is limited to cotenants, with a provision that the
"land" shall not be sold, construction is more difficult. In Voellinger v. Kirchner, 314
111. 398, 145 N. E. 638 (1924), a testator devised land on trust for his wife for life; sub-
ject to the life estate, he devised the land to his children; he further provided that said
"real estate" should not be "sold" until the death of the wife, when the trustee should
"distribute" among the children. Partition was allowed, the court holding that there
was a void restraint upon alienation, but no restraint upon partition. Considering the
presence of the word "distribute," one feels that the line of demarcation between this
decision and those cited supra note 337 is a nice one. In Daubman v. Daubman, 353 Ii1.
69, 186 N. E. 520 (1933), there was a prohibition upon "sale" until the death of the
survivor of six children, and a provision that until such time the income from the land
should be divided equally among the children. It was here held that partition could
not be had during the lives of the children. If this decision is to be reconciled with
Voellinger v. Kirchner, supra, it must be upon the ground that the context showed that
"sale" was here intended to mean a partition sale. Cf. Lane v. Lane, 90 Mass, 350 (1864);
Reinders v. Koppelman, 68 Mo. 482 (1878).
342. In Porter v. Tracey, 179 Iowa 1295, 162 N. W. 800 (1917), a provision against
"sale" was interpreted to mean "partition sale," and partition was accordingly denied.
This conclusion was based principally upon evidence aliunde the will. And ef. Reld v.
Armistead, 151 So. 874 (Ala. 1934). In Young v. Young, 49 S, W. 1074 (Ky. 1899), it
provision that the land should not be "alienated or encumbered" was held to bar partition
by sale. This decision was logically justified by the Kentucky rule allowing restraints
upon alienation for a reasonable period.
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been so held in some cases, 3 3 in others there is apparently a disposition
to hold the restraint void in its entirety.2
A restraint upon "sale for division," or equivalent language, appears
ambiguous.345 It might be taken to express a restraint upon partition
by sale; or a restraint upon all partition; or even a restraint upon trans-
fer of the undivided interests. The construction last suggested may be
thought reasonable in view of the fact that, when a cotenant succeeds in
selling his undivided interest, there has been one sort of "division"
effected as between him and his cotenants; he now owns in severalty the
proceeds of his sale. A provision that the land conveyed in cotenancy
shall "remain unencumbered and intact" also presents a difficulty of con-
struction. From the word "intact," one may infer the intent to restrain
partition; but the word "encumbered" clearly forbids one kind of aliena-
tion of the undivided interests. The provision may well be regarded as
a void restraint upon alienation as distinguished from one upon parti-
tion.
346
A gift over upon failure of cotenants to effect a partition within a
given time does not restrain partition; it encourages it. If such a gift
over is void, it must be for reasons similar to those suggested previously
in connection with the cases of gifts over upon failure to alienate.
4T
343. Cox v. Johnson, 242 IRl. 159, 89 N. E. 697 (1909); Peter-on v. Damond , 93
Neb. 370, 152 N. W. 786 (1916).
344. Oxley v. Lane, Greene v, Greene, Adams v. Berger, all supra note 335. In all
of these New York cases the question arose in a suit for construction of the instrument
containing the restriction. In the case, In re Estate nf Schilling, 102 Mich. 612, 61 N.
W. 62 (1894), the court declared a proviso against "sale or divi;on" void, and held that
compensation due for a taking by eminent'domain was distributable immediately.
345. In Cammack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268, 250 S. W. 963 (1923), and in Clark v.
Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 AUt. 24 (1904), restraints in this phraseology were held void, ap-
parently being viewed as restraints upon alienation rather than upon partition.
346. In Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739 (1891), such a restriction was
apparently regarded as a restraint upon alienation, despite the fact that there was a fur-
ther provision against "partition or division.' In Perry v. Metcalf, 216 Ky. 755, 23s S.
W. 694 (1926), a provision that the land should remain "intact and unsold" was held to
be a restraint upon alienation. In Kepley v. Overton, 74 Ind. 448 (1881), a provision that
the land should be "kept together" until a future date, and then "equally divided" was
held to be a valid restriction against partition. In Ex parte Watts, 130 N. C. 237, 41
S. E. 289 (1902), a devise provided: "They -;hall own said house and lot as a common
home for themselves and with equal rights to and in the same, until twenty-one years
after the death of both their parents, then the said ...and their heirs, shall own the
said house and lot in fee simple." This provision was held to bar partition by sale. Cf.
Daubman v. Daubman, 353 Ill. 69, 1S6 N. E. 520 (1933); Brown v. Brown, 43 Ind. 474
(1873); Wilson v. Barnes, 169 AtI. 791 (Md. 1934).
347. Such a gift was held void in Shaw v. Ford, 7 Ch. D. 669 (1877).
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VII
THE CONSENT QUALIFICATION IN RESTRAINTS UPON ALIENATION
OR PARTITION
A restraint upon alienation, whether in the forfeiture or the disabling
form, may be qualified to allow transfer with the consent of one or more
designated persons. This qualification of the restraint may make it
slightly less obnoxious to public policy than it otherwise would be, for
it makes alienation possible provided the necessary consent can be se-
cured. If the consent of a single person is required, it might be thought
probable that it could be obtained. If the consent of several persons is
necessary, the likelihood of all assenting is more remote.
Where the restraint is cast in the forfeiture form, it may be observed
that the consent qualification can be a material factor only if the consent
required is that of some person other than the owner of the future
interest created by the forfeiture provision. The owner of such interest
may always release it; a provision for alienation with his consent, there-
fore, does not increase the possibility of alienation in any degree.
While there has been comparatively little specific discussion of the
point, the decisions, apparently without exception, ignore the consent
qualification. Thus, a perpetual restraint is void, although alienation
with consent is permitted;348 and a restraint for a period measured in
lives or years is likewise void, despite the consent qualification.3 40 It is
immaterial whether the person whose consent must be obtained is con-
veyor,350 a cotenant of the conveyee,s5' or some other person.85 2 It is
348. Nashville Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1931) (disabling re-
straint); majority opinions in McRae v. McRae, 30 Ont. Rep. 54 (1898), commented upon
supra note 113; cf. Cronk v. Shoup, 70 Colo. 71, 197 Pac. 756 (1921).
349. Restraints disabling in form: Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 Pac. 118 (1883);
Muhlke v. Tiedemann, 177 fll. 606, 52 N. E. 843 (1899); Miller v. Denny, 99 Ky. 53, 34
S. W. 1079 (1896); Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 Atl. 24 (1904); Northwest Realty Co.
v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 Aft. 245 (1929); Lane v. Lane, 90 Mass. 350 (1864); Schwren
v. Falls, 170 N. C. 251, 87 S. E. 49 (1915); cf. Armstrong v. McAlpine, 4 Ont. App, 250
(1879) (commented upon note 113 supra); Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273, 49 So. 676 (1909).
Restraint in forfeiture form: Manierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104, 78 Atl. 507 (1911).
Covenants not to alienate without consent were held void in Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal.
423, 42 Pac. 908 (1895); Windsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (1892).
350. Murray v. Green; Miller v. Denny; Northwest Realty Co. v. Serio, all supra
note 349; Nashville Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1931); McRae v.
McRae, 30 Ont. Rep. 54 (1898); cf. Cronk v. Shoup, 70 Colo. 71, 197 Pac. 756 (1921).
351. Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 AtI. 24 (1904); Lane v. Lane, 90 Mass. 350 (1864);
Windsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (1892).
352. Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal. 423, 42 Pac. 908 (1895); Muhlke v. Tiedemann, 177
Ill. 606, 52 N. E. 843 (1899); Schwren v. Falls, 170 N. C. 251, 87 S. E. 49 (1915); Man.
ierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104, 78 Ati. 507 (1911); cf. Armstrong v. McAlpine, 4 Oat. App.
250 (1879); Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273, 49 So. 676 (1909).
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also immaterial whether a single consent is required," 3 or" more. 5
Restraints upon partition are sometimes similarly qualified to permit
partition with the consent of all the cotenants.3 It is not dear that
this qualification subtracts anything from the effect that the restriction
would otherwise have as an impediment to alienation. A restraint upon
partition, as previously suggested, does not prevent a voluntary division.
A partition consented to by all the cotenants is no more than a volun-
tary one, even though it may be carried out in the form of a suit in
equity. A restraint upon partition arising out of an agreement among
cotenants may always be abrogated by the joint action of all the con-
tracting parties. Such a restriction, therefore, necessarily includes the
effect of a consent provision.00
VIII
SO=E CONSEQUENCES OF THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF A RESTRAINT
Certain consequences of the validity or invalidity of a restraint may
be noted briefly. If a restraint is void, the interest subject thereto is,
nevertheless, valid. While there has been an occasional expression of
judicial opinion to the contrary," 7 this rule is now established every-
353. Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 Pac. 118 (1833); Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal. 423,
42 Pac. 903 (1895); Windsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (1892); Northwest
Realty Co. v. Serio, 156 M d. 229, 144 At. 245 (1929); Nashville Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn.
661, 39 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1931); McRae v. McRae, 30 Ont. Rep. 54 (1898); cf. Hill v.
Gray, 160 Ala. 273, 49 So. 676 (1909); Cronk v. Shoup, 70 Colo. 71, 197 Pac. 756 (1921);
Armstrong v. McAlpine, 4 Ont. App. 250 (1379).
354. Mubhlke v. Tiedemann, 177 Ill. 606, 52 N. E. 843 (1899); Miller v. Denny, 99
Ky. 53, 34 S. W. 1079 (1896); Lane v. Lane, 90 Mass. 350 (1864); Clark v. Clark, 99
Md. 356, 58 AtL 24 (1904); Schwren v. Falls, 170 N. C. 251, 87 S. E. 49 (1915); Man-
ierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104, 78 At. 507 (1911).
355. As in Porter v. Tracey, 179 Iowa 1295, 162 N. W. SOD (1917); Haeus-er v.
Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 88, 19 S. W. 75 (1S92); Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App.
Div. 515, 139 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't, 1913); d. Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 At.
24 (1904); Lane v. Lane, 90 Mass. 350 (1864).
356. No case has been found in which a court has dearly and definitely attached im-
portance to the consent qualification. In Hunt v. Wright, 47 N. H. 396 (1867), a restraint
upon partition, unlimited in time, was held valid. It appeared that a majority of the
cotenants had power to dissolve the restraint. See note 334 supra. In Haeussler v. Mis-
souri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 88, 19 S. W. 75 (1892), a perpetual restraint upon partition was
not saved by a consent provision. Cf. Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App. Div. 515, 139
N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't, 1913).
357. The decision of the New York Supreme Court in Hacker v. Hacker, 75 MLc. 3S0,
133 N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1912), holding that an unlawful restraint on alienation
invalidated the gift subject thereto, was reversed in the Appellate Division, 153 App.
Div. 270, 138 N. Y. Supp. 194 (2d Dep't, 1912).
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whereY5as In the very great majority of the cases, the point has been
assumed without comment.
If a restraint upon alienation is valid, the possibility of making title to
the land affected depends upon the form of the restraint. If a restraint
cast in the disabling form be held valid and effective according to its
terms, by no means can the estate subject to the restraint be so conveyed
as to create in the transferee an immediately valid and unimpeachable
title. A disabling restraint creates in the conveyor who has declared
it no future interest capable of release by him or his heirs. The validity
of a transfer in violation of the restraint can be questioned only by the
person who has conveyed in violation thereof, or persons claiming under
him."' 9 If the disabling restraint is limited in duration, and the person
subject thereto should survive the period of restraint, it would seem that
he could not thereafter question the validity of a conveyance by warranty
deed made during the period of restraint. The doctrine of estoppel by
deed would vest the title in his grantee at the expiration of the period
of restraint, or would at least create an equity in the grantee to call for
a conveyance.
360
Where the restraint is in the forfeiture form, a future interest is
created in the conveyor or his heirs, or in some other person by a gift
over. Though this restraint be valid, by the joinder of the conveyee upon
whom it has been imposed and the owner of this future interest, a
perfect title can be made.361 Where the restraint is created in a will,
and no gift ovcr is expressly limited, the future interest resulting must
accrue to the residuary devisee or the heirs of the testator. It may
happen that the person subject to the restraint is himself the heir. In
such case he can transfer a perfect title.3 2 In like manner, where land
358. Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves. 324 (Ch. 1797); Ripperdan v. Weldy, 149 Cal. 667,
87 Pac. 276 (1906); Ogle v. Burmister, 146 Iowa 33, 124 N. W. 758 (1910); MeNamara
v. McNamara, 293 Ill. 54, 127 N. E. 130 (1920); Reeder v. Antrim, 64 Ind. App. 83,
110 N. E. 568 (1915); McDowell v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57 (1855); Schermerhorn v. Negus,
I Denio 448 (N. Y. 1845); Oxley v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 340 (1866); Greene v. Greene, 125
N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739 (1891); Booker v. Booker, 119 App. Div. 482, 104 N. Y. Supp.
21 (2d Dep't, 1907); Walker v. Vincent, 19 Pa. 369 (1852); Manierre v. Welling, 32 R. I.
104, 78 At]. 507 (1911); Re Goodhue Trusts, 47 Ont. L. R. 178 (1920). The Louisiana
Code, art. 1519, expressly provides that conditions "contrary to the laws" are "reputed
not written." Succession of Feitel, 176 La. 543, 146 So. 145 (1933).
359. See supra, subtitle I.
360. M'Wllams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 507 (Pa. 1816); Peters v. N. W. Mutual Life Ins,
Co., 119 Neb. 161, 227 N. W. 917 (1929).
361. Francis v. Big Sandy Co., 171 Ky. 209, 188 S. W. 345 (1916). If the restraint
in Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 380, 183 N. W. 186 (1921), can be construed as a for-
feiture restraint, that case is another illustration of the possibility of making title In this
manner.
362. In Gray v. Shinn, 293 Ill. 573, 127 N. E. 755 (1920), land had been devised to
A for life, with a contingent remainder. A was sole heir. It was provided that A should
not convey or encumber his life estate. If this provision could be construed to create
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has been devised to two or more persons as tenants in common, subject
to a forfeiture restraint, and such persons succeed to the future interest
by descent, they can convey an absolute title by joinder.
A contract to convey land upon the expiration of a valid restraint is
enforceable. In Voris v. Renshaw,3 the restraint expressly permitted
a lease for years. The conveyee leased for ninety-nine years, and bound
himself to convey the title at the expiration of the period of restraint.
It was held that, assuming the restraint to be valid, the execution of the
lease did not constitute a breach thereof, and the contract to convey was
specifically enforceable. To grant specific performance of such a con-
tract nullifies in large degree the effect of the restraint which initially
has been assumed to be valid.
A valid restraint upon alienation is effective to preclude a sale under
a statute providing for judicial sale of land in which certain future inter-
ests have been limited1 It has been held in one state, however, that
a restraint upon alienation does not bar a judicial sale when it is neces-
sary to provide for the support of infant owners.-" Indeed, it would
seem unlikely that a court would permit even a valid restraint to pre-
clude a judicial sale where unforeseen contingencies have arisen which
render such a sale highly desirable for all persons concernedY7T
a forfeiture restraint, then A as heir succeeded to the future interest resulting, and vas
able to make good title, since the contingent remainder was destructible. If the future
interest created by a forfeiture restraint be transferred to the conveyce, the latter is then in
a position to make title. Cf. West Tenn. Co. v. Townes, 52 F. (2d) 764 (N. D. Miss.
1931).
If the devisee subject to restraint is but one of several heirs, he inherits a proportionate
part of the future interest created by a restraint in the forfeiture form. Any transfer
by him will be effectual, therefore, to pass an indefeasible title to a fractional interest in
the land. Pennyman v. McGrogan, 18 U. C. C. P. 132 (1868).
363. Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Caines 346 (N. Y. 1805). It would seem that Walker
v. Walker, 139 Ga. 547, 77 S. E. 795 (1913) might be supported upon this ground. See
also Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 515 (1881).
364. 49 Ill. 425 (1867).
365. Morton's Guardian v. Morton, 120 Ky. 251, 85 S. W. 1188 (1g05); Gaines v.
Sullivan, 117 S. C. 475, 109 S. E. 276 (1921). Cf. Chenault v. Burgess, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
569, 93 S. W. 664 (1906), in which the restraint was limited to prohibition upon sale
for purpose of reinvestment. The Kentucky statute expressly provided that no such sa
should be ordered if forbidden by the deed, will or contract under which the prop2rty
was held. While no sale could be ordered in a suit based upon this statute, it was con-
ceded that the person affected by the restraint could sell his interest. Cl. Walker v.
Walker, 139 Ga. 547, 77 S. E. 795 (1913) in which the restraint was expresily qualified
to allow a judicial sale for purpose of reinvestment. Cf. also Stewart v. Brady, 66 Ky.
623 (1868).
366. Bouldin v. Miller, 87 Tex. 359, 28 S. W. 940 (1894).
367. In trust cases, courts of equity have often ordered sale although it appeared
clearly by implication that the settlor did not intend the trustee to have such a power.
Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862); Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 105 N. E. 497
(1914); d. Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S. W. 840 (1912). In
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Where land upon which a restraint is imposed has been condemned in
eminent domain proceedings, it would seem that the restraint, if valid
initially, should be regarded as terminated. Otherwise, it would be
necessary to place the compensation money in a trust fund for the period
of the restraint. In the cases in which the problem has arisen, the re-
straint was regarded as void; upon this ground, the compensation money
was held to be distributable immediately.0
some instances, sale has been ordered where expressly prohibited by the terms of the
trust. Gillespie v. Winston's Trustee, 170 Ky. 667, 186 S. W. 517 (1916); cf. Colonial
Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555 (1926). Compare also the equitable
doctrine whereby land in which certain legal future interests have been limited may be
ordered sold when contingencies probably not foreseen by the creator of such Interests
render a sale necessary for the protection of all parties concerned. 8chnebly, 3upra note
337 at 54-62.
368. In re Machu, 21 Ch. D. 838 (1882); Dept. of Public Works v. Porter, 327 111,
28, 158 N. E. 366 (1927); In re Estate of Schilling, 102 Mich. 612, 61 N. W. 62 (1894).
